US-Japan trade friction and its dilemmas for US policy by Noland, Marcus
US-Japan Trade Friction and its 
Dilemmas for US Policy 
Marcus Noland 
Working Paper No. 78 
Marcus Noland 
Council of Economic Advisors 
Old Executive Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20500 
(202) 395-3310 
FAX (202) 395-6947 
This paper draws heavily on Reconcilable Differences? by C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus 
Noland. I am grateful to participants of the Japan Economic Seminar for helpful comments 
on an earlier version of this paper. The views expressed herein are purely the author's and 
should not be interpreted to reflect any official position of the Council of Economic Advisors 
or the United States Government. 
Working Paper Series 
Center on Japanese Economy and Business 
Graduate School of Business 
Columbia University 
November 1993 
US-JAPAN TRADE FRICTION AND ITS DILEMMAS FOR US POLICY 
Marcus Noland 
Council of Economic Advisers 
Old Executive Office Building 
Washington, DC 20500 
(202)-395-3310 
(202)-395-6947 (fax) 
This paper draws heavily on Reconcilable Differences? by C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland. 
I am grateful to participants of the Japan Economic Seminar for helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. The views expressed herein are purely the author's and should not be 
interpreted to reflect any official position of the Council of Economic Advisers or the United 
States Government. 
INTRODUCTION 
Trade frictions between the United States and Japan go back well over a century. While 
the form and substance of these problems have changed significantly since the time of 
Commodore Perry, the size and technological dynamism of the contemporary Japanese economy 
present US policymakers with a unique set of challenges. Bergsten and Noland (1993) group 
these challenges into four categories: microeconomic, structural, macroeconomic, and systemic. 
The focus of this paper is on the policy problems posed by the microeconomic and structural 
differences in the two economies, both because these are the most controversial intellectually and 
well and the most sensitive politically, at least in the United States. Moreover, this paper is 
exclusively on the Japan-related aspects of these problems, for reasons of both brevity and the 
presumed interests of the audience of this volume. This is certainly not to say that policies and 
practices in Japan are the source of all of the problems in the bilateral relationship: a persuasive 
case can probably be made that much of the tension in the bilateral relationship stems from 
anxiety in the US over declining competitiveness which is largely a domestic issue. Nonetheless, 
this paper focuses on Japan-related concerns. The structure of the paper is to first examine the 
issue of Japanese uniqueness (which provides the justification for a Japan-specific policy), then 
evaluates the significance of this issue for the US economy. The paper then moves toward a 
more normative analysis, examining possible alternative policy approaches, and concludes with 
a discussion of current US policy toward Japan. 
EVIDENCE OF DISTINCTIVENESS 
By a variety of measures, Japan has a distinctive trade pattern. Japan has an unusually 
low share of manufactured imports in domestic consumption, an unusually low share of 
intraindustry trade, an unusually small share of domestic sales accounted for by foreign-owned 
2 
firms, and an unusually high share of intrafirm trade, which is predominantly controlled by 
Japanese firms. As the line of table 1 makes clear, relatively few manufactured imports make 
it into the Japanese market. The share of imports in Japanese consumption of manufactures is 
less than half that in other major industrial countries. Moreover, unlike in the other countries, 
which have experienced considerable increases in this import penetration ratio, the Japanese 
imported manufactures share has remained essentially flat, never rising above 6 percent since 
at least 1975 (cf. Balassa and Noland 1988, table 3.2; Dornbusch 1992, table 8; Advisory 
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations 1993). The interpretation of these raw statistics 
is problematic: it is unclear whether the low level of imports in domestic manufactures 
consumption reflects protection or the comparative advantage of a capital-abundant country with 
few natural resources, far from other developed countries. 
Another interesting aspect of the Japanese trade pattern, identified by a number of 
researchers (e.g., Scott 1987, Lawrence 1987, Balassa and Noland 1988, Lincoln 1990, Noland 
1990a), is the relatively low level of intraindustry trade. The term "intraindustry trade" refers 
to the two-way trade in differentiated manufactures within a given industry. This trade tends to 
increase as economies develop and the demands of firms and consumers become more complex, 
so that no individual firm is able to produce a sufficiently broad range of products to satisfy all 
demands. (An example of intraindustry trade would be cross-border trade in different makes and 
models of automobiles.) Intraindustry trade is sometimes argued to be of particular importance 
because the adjustment costs associated with an expansion of intraindustry trade are thought to 
be lower than that associated with a comparable expansion of interindustry trade. 
As shown in table 1, Japan's intraindustry trade appears to be somewhat lower than that 
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of comparable industrial countries. One interpretation (figuring most prominently in Lincoln 
1990) is that this relatively low level of intraindustry trade in manufactures reflects a relatively 
closed Japanese market. According to this view, once Japanese firms begin producing a good, 
competing imports are excluded from the market either through public policies or through 
private arrangements. While this certainly may be the case, analytically it is difficult to 
determine if the observed low degree of intraindustry penetration reflects the exclusion of 
imports or the hypercompetitiveness of the domestic industry. 
The Japanese trade pattern appears distinctive in at least two other dimensions. The first 
is the unusually high share of intrafirm trade. Intrafirm trade is important both as a major 
channel of trade and because of the suspicions that intracorporate transactions are less governed 
by the normal price/cost determinants than arm's length transactions are.1 
The issue is of considerable interest with regard to Japan because of Japan's unusual 
pattern of intrafirm trade. For most countries, intrafirm trade is dominated by the intrafirm 
1
 Concern has also been expressed over the transfer of technology through intrafirm trade. 
In particular, it has been alleged that Japanese firms are acquiring technology through their 
acquisition of US firms. The data on royalties and license fees should be regarded with a 
considerable degree of skepticism since tax and other considerations may strongly influence how 
firms price these transactions. For what they are worth, the existing data (Department of 
Commerce, 1993) indicate that the US-based manufacturing affiliates of Japanese parents have 
consistently been net importers of technology, with net payments of $153 million in 1991. 
Service affiliates were net exporters of technology in 1991, with $5 million in net revenues. 
Altogether, transactions between Japanese parents and their affiliates account for less than 10 
percent of the royalties and license payments between foreign parents and US-based affiliates. 
In other words, intrafirm trade between Japanese parents and US affiliates does not appear to 
be a major avenue of technology transfer, and to the extent that technology transfer has 
occurred, the predominant direction has been from Japan to the US. 
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shipments by parent firms to their foreign affiliates. This means that exports from domestic 
parents to their foreign affiliates exceed the exports generated by the domestically based affiliates 
of foreign firms back to the foreign parent. The reverse holds for imports. Japan is unusual 
in that Japanese parents dominate both export and import trade (Lawrence, 1991a; Encarnation 
1992). Lawrence (1991a) attributes this to the prominent role of giant trading companies in 
Japanese trade, and he argues that this pattern of trade is consistent with imperfectly competitive 
Japanese domestic markets. 
Table 2 reports data on US bilateral trade with Europe and Japan. In the case of Europe, 
US parents account for just under 30 percent of US exports to Europe, while the US-based 
affiliates of European firms account for around 10 percent of US exports to Europe. In the case 
of imports, this ordering is reversed: shipments from European parents to their US affiliates 
account for nearly 40 percent of imports, while imports by US parents from their European 
affiliates account for 10-15 percent of imports. 
The second panel of Table 2 reports data on Japan. Two things are immediately obvious. 
First, intrafirm trade is a more important part of US-Japan trade than US-Europe trade, and 
second, trade in both directions is dominated by Japanese firms. 
In contrast to the European case, US exports to Japan are dominated by shipments from 
US-based affiliates of Japanese firms back to parents in Japan, accounting for 46.9 percent of 
all US exports to Japan in 1990. (Although quite high, this figure has actually declined from 
58.4 percent in 1986.) Exports by US parents to their Japanese affiliates accounted for only 15-
20 percent, depending on the definition of affiliate used, though this still represents a substantial 
increase over the figure in 1986. 
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In the case of imports, virtually all US imports from Japan are intrafirm, with shipments 
from Japanese parents to their US affiliates accounting for more than 80 percent of US imports 
from Japan. This may be a bit misleading as more than a third of this is accounted for by 
wholesale trade in automobiles and parts. 
It is possible that the unusual pattern and prominence of intrafirm trade between the US 
and Japan is due to the commodity composition of that trade. That is to say, Japan specializes 
in products characterized by intensive intrafirm trade, so that the high observed levels of 
intrafirm trade are a product of trade composition, not unusual Japanese behavior. This 
proposition was investigated by calculating intrafirm trade shares excluding Japan using 
disaggregated data, then weighing these figures by the Japanese commodity composition of trade. 
This calculation indicates that if Japan's intensity of intrafirm trade was the same as Europe's, 
the US-based affiliates of Japanese firms would account for 32 percent of US exports to Japan 
(in contrast to the 46.9 percent actually observed), while exports from Japanese parents to their 
US affiliates would account for 33 percent of US imports (instead of 81.6 percent). 
The flip side of this phenomenon, reported in the final line of table 1, is that foreign 
firms account for a minuscule fraction of sales in the Japanese market. This reflects the low 
level of imports, the predominant control of those imports that do enter by Japanese firms, and 
the low level of inward foreign direct investment. 
These distinctive characteristics do not prove that the Japanese market is completely 
closed to foreigners or their goods. Indeed, a number of US firms such as Schick (safety razors), 
Coca-Cola Japan (soft drinks), and Johnson & Johnson (adhesive bandages) dominate their 
markets in Japan (Morgan and Morgan 1991, table 6.1). Nevertheless, the aggregate figures do 
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establish that the role of foreigners and foreign-made goods is unusually low in the Japanese 
economy. 
EXPLANATIONS OF DISTINCTIVENESS 
Explanations of this apparent distinctiveness can be gathered into two broad groups, one 
emphasizing direct trade and industrial policy interventions and the other, structural 
characteristics of the economy. As for the former group of explanations, domestic support 
policies in Japan have included direct subsidies, preferential tax treatment, preferential access 
to credit, government procurement preferences, establishment of producer cartels, and public 
subsidization of research and development (R&D) consortia. External policies have included 
trade protection, restrictions on inward foreign direct investment, and control over high-
technology trade. These policies contain both domestic and trade components and have been 
applied to both emerging infant industries and declining senescent ones. 
Serious analyses of Japanese industrial policies indicate that in total these policies have 
probably been welfare-reducing: on balance, they shifted resources from high- to low-
productivity uses, and have not been targeted sufficiently narrowly within the manufacturing 
sector to capture rents effectively. Japan's industrial support policies could thus be regarded as 
compensation for the negative net transfer from the Japanese manufacturing sector (cf. Krugman 
1987, Lee 1989, and Noland 1993). 
For its part, Japan, like many other countries in the immediate postwar period, operated 
a tightly controlled import trade regime justified as a response to severe balance of payments 
constraints. The main policy tool for controlling imports was foreign exchange allocations, but 
the government also maintained high tariffs and extensive systems of quotas and import 
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licensing. The government supported producers in preferred sectors with subsidized loans and 
special tax treatment. 
In 1955, with the support of the United States, Japan became a contracting party to the 
GATT and began a gradual period of import liberalization. Most quotas in the manufacturing 
sector had been eliminated by the beginning of the Kennedy Round of GATT trade negotiations 
in 1964, but manufactures tariffs remained high by European or American standards and 
involved considerable escalation by degree of processing.2 
This tendency toward gradual relaxation of border measures in manufactures continued 
through the 1970s and 1980s, so that by the mid-1980s tariff levels in Japan were comparable 
to (if not somewhat lower than) those maintained by the United States and the European 
Community, and quotas had been largely eliminated.3 As of 1989, the applied simple average 
tariff rate for industrial products (excluding petroleum) was 5.3 percent, and the weighted 
average 1.9 percent (GATT 1990). 
The existence of nontariff barriers in Japan is indisputable: data compiled by Learner 
(1990) for 1983 (the only year for which data are available) show that a simple average of 46.7 
percent, or a trade-weighted average of 61.7 percent, of US exports to Japan encountered some 
2
 See Komiya and Itoh (1988) for further discussion. 
3
 There were, and continue to be, a few exceptions, however. High tariffs on 
semiconductors, computers, and numerically controlled machine tools (which were classified as 
computers) were maintained until 1979, when they were reduced as part of the Tokyo Round 
agreement. Quotas on leather and leather footwear products were converted to a tariff-quota 
scheme in 1986, and since then imports have grown rapidly. Orderly marketing agreements have 
been negotiated covering raw silk, and a prior confirmation system exists for the importation of 
silk fabrics. In 1989, a voluntary export restraint was negotiated with Korean knitwear 
producers, which expired in 1991, and in 1993, Japan imposed its first antidumping duties, 
against Chinese producers of ferro-silicon manganese, a steelmaking material. 
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form of nontariff barrier, indicating that not only are these barriers ubiquitous, but they are 
erected disproportionately in sectors of US specialization.4 What is controversial is their 
significance. 
STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES 
In Japan there is scant evidence of significant tariffs or quotas outside of agriculture.5 
Nevertheless, it is widely believed that the Japanese market is effectively closed to manufactured 
imports. Structural barriers alleged to deter imports include the reliance on bureaucratic control 
to ensure product safety; domestic cartels, discriminatory networks of affiliated firms (keiretsu), 
and weak competition policies; lack of intellectual property protection; government procurement 
procedures that advantage domestic suppliers; and restrictions on the distribution channels for 
imported products, to name a few.6 
4
 Conversely, a simple average of 9.9 percent, or a trade-weighted average of 34.9 percent, 
of Japanese exports to the United States in 1983 (when the auto VER was binding) encountered 
nontariff barriers, indicating that Japanese exports also disproportionately face such barriers in 
the US market. These nontariff barrier data were originally collected by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). See Laird and Yeats (1990) for a 
description of the UNCTAD methodology. See Lawrence (1992) for a very useful survey of the 
issues covered in this section. 
5
 Indeed, the Japanese government has undertaken a number of policies to increase the 
amounts of imports in Japan. These have included the establishment of special import promotion 
areas, more-generous public financial institution support for the importation of manufactured 
goods, tax breaks for the importation of manufactured goods, administrative guidance, and 
supplementary budget allocations earmarked for imports. 
In addition, a proposal was floated, but never acted upon, to use the consumption tax 
rebate on exports (more than ¥1 trillion) to promote imports. 
6
 Well-known anecdotes provide grist for the mill. In one case, a plan to import gasoline 
came to naught when government officials successfully pressured the prospective importer's bank 
to withdraw financing. In another case, small fiberglass boats were kept out of the Japanese 
market by subjecting them to inappropriate testing procedures designed for concrete boats (such 
as dropping them). Standards introduced for ski equipment, purportedly to fit the "unique" 
Japanese snow, excluded foreign-made equipment and foreign manufacturers who were not 
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Moreover, close examination of individual industry case studies indicates that these 
regulatory barriers tend to emerge in industries where domestic producer lobbies are strong: 
either primary-product sectors where there are well-established producer lobbies, or highly 
concentrated or cartelized manufacturing and service sectors where the small number of producer 
firms facilitates the organization of industry lobbies. This confluence of public and private 
barriers inhibits entry by newcomers, whether foreign or domestic. 
In Japan, where product liability law is very weak, product safety is ensured through a 
bureaucratic standards, testing, and certification system.7 In practice that system is susceptible 
to capture by producer interests and can act as a nontariff barrier to trade. Numerous cases exist 
in which Japanese standards were written or changed to exclude imported products, often after 
imports had begun to significantly penetrate the market, or in which foreign producers 
apprised of the standard-setting process, although at the time they supplied about half of the skis 
sold in Japan. Particularly intriguing was the long-standing Japanese customs practice (now 
discontinued) of slicing Dutch tulip bulbs in half to check for insects. In the words of Jagdish 
Bhagwati (1988, 69), once the bulbs were severed, "even Japanese ingenuity could not put them 
together again.'' For additional examples and documentation, see Balassa and Noland (1988) and 
Lincoln (1990). 
7
 Japan deliberately uses bureaucratic control as a substitute for the tort system. Plaintiffs 
must not only prove that a product was defective and caused injury, but that the manufacturer 
was negligent. As a consequence of this stiff burden of proof, and the relative lack of access to 
legal counsel for redress, product liability suits in Japan are rare: a recent survey of 194 big 
Japanese manufacturers found that only 24 had ever faced a product liability suit in Japan, and 
only 7 had lost {The Economist, 18 July 1992). Japanese citizens have far less access to the legal 
system generally than their counterparts in other developed countries. The incidence of lawyers 
to the general population in 1 per 8,569 in Japan, compared with 1 per 1,286 in Germany and 
1 per 356 in the United States. In addition, Japan does not have a contingency fee system, so 
that plaintiffs must pay considerable advance fees. Moreover, the courts are understaffed to the 
point that the average civil case takes more than two years to resolve; complicated cases can take 
far longer. 
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encountered extreme difficulty in obtaining certification (Balassa and Noland 1988).8 
The standards, testing, and certification barriers just described are often encountered in 
concentrated or cartelized industries. Industrial structure issues are further complicated by the 
existence of keiretsu.9 These networks of affiliated firms typically have long-standing financial, 
managerial, and product market interlinkages. A keiretsu might consist of a group of large core 
firms horizontally linked across markets, together with their vertically linked input suppliers, and 
possibly a captive distribution network.10 
Keiretsu are inherently exclusionary. Firms within the group receive preference over 
those outside. This discrimination may apply equally to foreign and domestic firms outside the 
group. There are two salient issues. First, do the possible efficiency gains through better 
information exchange, coordination, and monitoring outweigh the implicit costs of maintaining 
8
 Recently, however, an unusual coalition of foreign firms and trade ministries, some 
domestic firms, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, the nascent consumer and "green" 
movements, and some political parties have been calling on the government to revise the product 
liability law. Japan's Economic Planning Agency has coordinated a review of the system and has 
released a report recommending that Japan move to a product liability system more similar to 
the European Community's. Like that in the United States, the EC system does not require proof 
of negligence on the part of producers. Unlike the US system, however, the EC system does not 
permit decision by jury or punitive damages. It is hoped that movement toward a strengthened 
product liability law would permit the dismantling of those parts of the regulatory structure that 
at times act as a nontariff barrier. 
9
 See Aoki (1987 and 1991) and Gerlach (1989 and 1992) for descriptions of the keiretsu. 
10
 For example, the Mitsui keiretsu consists of 24 major companies: Mitsui Bank (the 
group's main bank), Mitsui Trust (also a bank), Mitsui Life (insurance), Taisho F&M 
(insurance), Mitsui Bussan (a trading company), Mitsukoshi (a retailer), Mitsui Construction, 
Sanki Engineering, Mitsui Real Estate, Toray (textiles), Mitsui Toatsu (chemicals), Mitsui 
Petroleum, Mitsui Mining, Hokkaido Coal, Onoda Cement, Oji Paper, Japan Steel Works, 
Mitsui M&M (nonferrous metals), Toyota Motors, Mitsui Shipbuilding, Toshiba (electronics), 
Mitsui OSK (shipping), Mitsui Warehouse, and Nippon Flour. Cross-shareholding accounts for 
more than half of all the shares of these firms, and the main bank finances around one-fifth of 
all their borrowing (Gerlach 1989). 
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in-group preferences? Second, even if keiretsu are on balance efficiency-enhancing, how can this 
system, developed under what were essentially closed-economy conditions, be broadened to 
include non-Japanese firms, and made both more politically palatable and even more 
economically efficient? 
Analyses of the keiretsu have sometimes distinguished three roles. First are the financial 
links. It is sometimes argued that the cross-holding of shares among keiretsu firms, in contrast 
to the more open "Anglo-American" stock market model, allows managers to adopt longer time 
horizons because of reduced fear of takeover. At the same time, the heavier reliance on main-
bank loan finance and the pattern of cross-shareholding better facilitates monitoring of 
management decisions than would more diffuse ownership. The effects of keiretsu in the 
financial sphere are discussed in the section on foreign direct investment below. 
It is claimed that the vertical integration of major firms and component suppliers through 
keiretsu relationships may also be efficiency-enhancing.11 Product development is enhanced by 
firms' greater willingness to exchange information in the context of a long-standing relationship. 
It has been argued that the vertically organized keiretsu are an efficient halfway house between 
complete vertical integration within a single firm (with its attendant costs) on the one hand, and 
arm's-length transactions on the other, by balancing reliability and control against some degree 
of competition among suppliers.12 
11
 Torii and Caves (1992), for example, find that the extent of subcontracting is a robust 
explanator of increased industrial efficiency in Japan. 
12
 For example, American automobile producers reportedly source around 50 percent of their 
parts internally, while for Japanese automakers the figure is around 25 percent (Womack et al. 
1990). 
12 
A third aspect of the keiretsu is their distribution function: many of the major Japanese 
consumer-goods producers have captive distribution networks, sustained by vertical foreclosure 
practices that would be illegal in much of the rest of the world.13 Sophisticated econometric 
research by Ariga et al. (1991) points to administered prices in sectors where there are strong 
vertical relationships or keiretsu, suggesting that control of the distribution system acts as an 
effective barrier to entry. 
This problem is worsened by the preponderance of small, poorly capitalized stores in the 
Japanese retail system. The relative weakness of the retailers increases both the discriminatory 
impact of government regulations and the likelihood of capture by large manufacturers.14 The 
numerous small shopkeepers also act as the primary domestic pressure group to maintain 
regulations that impede the establishment of large retail stores. Indeed, the lack of access to the 
Japanese market by large US specialty retailers has been one aspect of the bilateral trade dispute. 
Not surprisingly, competition policy has become a major issue in bilateral relations 
between the United States and Japan, leading to action by both governments. Under US pressure 
as part of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks, Japan began a process of 
strengthening its competition laws and their enforcement in 1990.15 
13
 See Flath (1989) for a description of vertical restraints in Japan. 
14
 Of related interest are papers by Sato (1990), Ito and Maruyama (1991), Itoh (1991), and 
Nishimura (1991), which examine the efficiency of the Japanese distribution system. Cheng 
(1993) develops a theoretical model to show how inefficiency in the distribution system could 
give rise to higher consumer prices of an exportable good at home than abroad, and 
nonequivalence of distribution costs and tariffs. 
15
 The Japan Fair Trade Commission drafted guidelines on anticompetitive practices, 
especially in the distribution system, clarifying which practices are illegal and therefore subject 
to criminal sanctions and levies. The commission also issued new guidelines restricting the use 
of cross-ownership of stock as a condition of doing business or as a means of limiting third-party 
13 
The result has been a significant increase in the number of antitrust actions in Japan, 
although the degree of activity remains well below that observed in the United States. New 
guidelines were issued in some industries, and investigations were launched in others, including 
the financial, automobile, auto parts, paper products, and glass industries. Punitive surcharges 
have been running significantly higher than in the past, criminal charges were brought against 
firms in 1991 and 1993 (after only a single case in the preceding 17 years), and for the first time 
criminal charges were brought in a bid-rigging case.16 (Ironically, some of the firms involved 
in these cases were the Japanese subsidiaries of US firms.) The US government has expressed 
satisfaction that reforms of the Large Scale Retail Store Law, which was alleged to have 
hindered both the importation of goods and the entrance of foreign retailers into the Japanese 
market, are being implemented. 
transactions. New rules also forbid a firm with more than 25 percent market share of a product 
from becoming the sole distributor of a similar imported product. Penalties have also been 
increased: the surcharge that can be levied on firms for engaging in illegal cartels was raised 
from 2 percent of sales to 6 percent (the United States had originally requested 10 percent); this 
surcharge is the chief financial deterrent to illegal cartelization. The maximum criminal fine was 
raised from ¥5 million to ¥100 million, an impressive increase, but still far below comparable 
limits in the United States or the European Community. (A Japan Fair Trade Commission 
Advisory Council had recommended a higher ceiling on corporations, but this was opposed by 
business interests and politicians. The council had also recommended raising the ceiling on 
criminal fines for individuals, but this was left unchanged. These recommendations were of 
debatable importance in any event: in only one case up until that time had criminal penalties 
been imposed during the postwar period.) The budget of the Fair Trade Commission was 
expanded, and the number of investigators was raised considerably, although the agency is still 
far smaller than its US counterparts (the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice's Antitrust Division). 
16
 The Fair Trade Commission angered the public, however, when it declined to press 
criminal charges in a Saitama prefecture dango, or construction bid-rigging case, which 
reportedly involved 66 construction firms (including Taisei, Japan's largest) and as much as $700 
million in public contracts. 
14 
Action has also been attempted in the United States. In April 1992, the US Justice 
Department announced that it would revive the rarely used policy of applying US antitrust laws 
extraterritorially. This decision was widely criticized in Japan and elsewhere for its unilateral 
nature. Foreign governments could retaliate, either by adopting a similar stance or by enacting 
"blocking statutes" that prohibit or restrict firms from complying with US court rulings, as 
several did during earlier episodes of this type. Indeed, internal opposition within the Bush 
administration, and a Japanese threat to block, effectively killed the Bush administration 
proposal.17 
Another explanation for the small role of manufactured imports in the Japanese economy 
is that restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI), both historical legal restrictions and 
private impediments in the form of oligopolies and the keiretsu, have impeded manufactured 
imports, especially of complex capital goods. For most of the postwar period, the Japanese 
government discouraged inward FDI. In the early postwar years, this was accomplished mainly 
through restrictions on converting domestic profits to foreign exchange for repatriation; later an 
17
 It would be preferable to reach multilateral (or even bilateral) agreement on competition 
policy. The United States already has a comity agreement with the European Community that 
facilitates cooperation between their competition policy authorities. The United States also has 
had success in prosecuting Japanese firms for bid rigging in contracts for services to US military 
bases in Japan. In one such case, the Justice Department reached an out-of-court settlement with 
99 Japanese construction firms for bid rigging at the Yokosuka Naval Base; the firms agreed to 
pay fines of $32.4 million, or 24 percent of the billed costs. In another case involving bid 
rigging at the Yokota Air Force Base, 11 Japanese electronics firms agreed to pay $36.7 million 
in fines, or nearly 36 percent of the value of the $103 million in contracts. Although these cases 
represent victories for US antitrust authorities, it would be desirable to more fully 
internationalize Japanese competition policy through either bilateral agreements or a broader 
agreement involving the European Community and perhaps other OECD countries as well. 
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extremely restrictive approval system for FDI served the same purpose.18 
In 1967, Japan began liberalizing its investment regime, and in 1980 the remaining legal 
obstacles were removed. Nonetheless, foreign firms continue to play an extraordinarily minor 
role in the Japanese economy (table 1). Strikingly, whereas in bilateral comparisons US and 
Japanese multinational firms exhibit similar behavior in third-country markets, their positions 
in each other's markets are very different (Bergsten and Noland, 1993, table 3.4). Even though 
the US firms' global stock of foreign investment is larger than Japanese firms', their stake in 
the Japanese market is only a quarter that of Japanese firms in the United States, according to 
US data; Japanese MOF data show the US firms' relative share to be even smaller (Bergsten and 
Noland, 1993).19 
18
 Mason (1992) likens Japanese policy at this time to a "screen door," designed to 
encourage inward technology transfer while discouraging inward FDI. Borrus et al. (1986, 96) 
similarly describe the government's role as that of a doorkeeper, "determining under what 
conditions capital, technology, and manufactured products enter and leave Japan." 
Put in another way, the Japanese government has used its various policy levers to bargain 
with foreigners from a monopsonist's standpoint. Goto and Wakasugi (1988, 190) provide the 
example of royalty payments on the importation of a particular Austrian steel production 
technology: these payments were "held down to 1 cent per ton for Japan through an agreement 
between MITI [the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry] and the industry, 
while the U.S. firms paid up to 35 cents per ton for the import of the same technology." What 
is common in the cases of steel, numerically controlled machine tools, microelectronics, and now 
possibly aircraft is a pattern of selective protection, strict regulation of inward FDI and 
technology transfer, and preferential tax treatment and access to capital until the industry has 
achieved international competitiveness. Rosovsky (1985) has called this pattern "the denial of 
the profits of innovation." 
19
 Foreign direct investment through merger, or acquisition of existing firms, is limited by 
the extensive cross-holding of shares through the main bank and keiretsu systems. A market for 
corporate control does not exist in Japan in the same way it does in the US. An alternative to 
investment through merger and acquisition would be through the establishment of new greenfield 
operations. In a 1991 survey of US firms operating in Japan, conducted for the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Japan by the consulting firm A. T. Kearney, respondents cited the 
high cost of doing business in Japan (largely high land costs), difficulties in locating and hiring 
16 
There is some evidence that this situation is easing. With the collapse of the Japanese 
bubble economy, the number of takeovers of Japanese firms by foreigners increased dramatically 
in 1992, although this was from a low base and remained far below the number of Japanese 
takeovers of foreign firms that same year (Bergsten and Noland, 1993, table 3.5). 
Indeed, in the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan survey most respondents 
thought that the climate for trade and investment in Japan was improving. A bare majority (52 
percent) indicated that the current climate was favorable or somewhat favorable, while 18 
percent thought that it was unfavorable. Fifty-five percent of the respondents thought that the 
investment climate had improved in the previous five years, while 40 percent saw no change, 
and 5 percent sensed deterioration. Two-thirds of the respondents expected continued 
improvement in the trade and investment climate over the next five years.20 
qualified personnel, general complexities in doing business in Japan, multitiered distribution 
systems, exclusionary business practices by the keiretsu, and bureaucratic practices that 
discriminate against foreign firms as the main barriers to investment. The respondents indicated 
that some problems on the US side—management short-termism, inability or unwillingness to 
modify products for the Japanese market, and quality problems—also impeded the US presence 
in Japan. 
20
 The improvement in the investment climate may be in part due to policies of the Japanese 
government. The government has expanded public financial institution lending and loan 
guarantees for inward FDI and has introduced tax incentives for foreign investors. (Subsidiaries 
of US firms receiving Japan Development Bank loans have included Mead Paperboard Japan 
KK, GE Plastics Japan Ltd., Corning Japan KK, LSI Logic KK, Procter & Gamble Far East 
Inc., Applied Materials Japan Inc., and AMP (Japan) Ltd. The new tax law permits foreign 
affiliates to carry forward losses in the first three years to be set off against taxable income for 
seven years-two years longer than the carryforward period allowed to Japanese companies.) 
MITI has established an organization to offer consulting services to firms investing in Japan. The 
Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), the most influential business lobby, 
fearing an increase in investment-related tensions, has called for the government to go further 
and expand the scope of tax breaks and public financial institution loans for inward FDI. The 
Keidanren has also proposed the liberalization of legal services to facilitate inward FDI. 
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Ultimately, this issue is of considerable economic and political importance. The fact that 
foreign firms have a relatively small presence in the Japanese market means that there is 
relatively weak political pressure in the home countries of multinationals to moderate their 
governments' policies toward Japan. Japan, in essence, holds few hostages. The development 
of a more symmetrical set of interdependencies would undoubtedly temper economic conflict 
between Japan and other countries. 
An alternative means of entering a foreign market, besides exporting or investing in 
subsidiaries, is to license or lease firm-specific assets to producers in that market. This strategy 
is contingent on the existence of an enforceable system of intellectual property rights. Intellectual 
property consists of valuable but intangible assets such as inventions, technology, technical 
information, brand names, identifying symbols, and distinctive styling of products. Property 
rights to these assets are usually protected by exclusive and enforceable patents, design 
registrations, trademarks and service marks, copyright laws, and trade secret laws. 
Intellectual property rights disputes between the United States and Japan fall into two 
interrelated categories. In the first category are disputes arising from systemic differences in the 
two countries' intellectual property regimes.21 The second category of disputes stem from 
21
 The United States has a "first-to-invent" patent system. This system is centered on the 
notion that the economy as a whole benefits from protecting the property rights of innovative 
entrepreneurial inventors. Patents are granted on the basis of which claimant is first to invent 
(rather than first to file an application), and technical information supporting the patent 
application is guarded closely during review. Foreigners have complained that the evidentiary 
rules effectively discriminate against foreign inventors (MTIT 1993). 
In contrast, Japan (along with nearly every other country in the world) has a "first-to-
file" system. Under these rules, the patent is awarded to the applicant who files first, regardless 
of who actually made the innovative discovery. This system is alleged to give an advantage to 
large firms, which can more easily routinize and finance the patent application procedure. Unlike 
under the "first-to-invent" system, information on the application is more readily available, and 
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simple conflicts over property rights, driven by technological rivalry. 
Japan's intellectual property rules have been widely criticized and were taken up in the 
context of the SII negotiations. The major complaint of foreign firms is that the Japanese 
implementation of its "first-to-file" system is inadequate. The average time required for a patent 
to be granted is five to six years, with some applications taking a decade or more. (In the United 
States the average time is 19 months.) Reasons for the long delays include too few inspectors, 
the practice of allowing firms to file oppositions to the patent before it is granted, and the 
requirement that applications be filed in Japanese (but with later correction of translation errors 
not permitted).22 As a result of the protracted process, Japanese firms can gain access to 
information on foreign technological developments before foreign firms have been able to secure 
their property rights. Moreover, since protection is granted from the date of filing, the delays 
can substantially erode the period of exclusivity that the innovating firm eventually enjoys.23 
indeed, one can argue that the system is essentially designed to accelerate the diffusion of 
technological advance throughout the economy. 
22
 The United States has 1,500 patent office officials, who handle 150,000 annual 
applications; the European Community has 1,300 officials to handle 50,000 applications; Japan, 
meanwhile, has fewer than 1,000 officials, who attempt to process 720,000 applications yearly. 
Japan is virtually alone among developed countries in allowing pregrant challenges to patents; 
the European Community discontinued this process because it was being abused by firms to 
delay the issuance of patents to rivals. 
23
 In one case, it took Corning Glass Works (now Corning Inc.) nearly a decade to obtain 
a fiber optics patent. In the meantime, Japanese rivals developed competing products. Corning 
sued, and Sumitomo Electric eventually paid the US firm $25 million in an out-of-court 
settlement. 
The most celebrated case, however, is the Texas Instruments Inc. (TI) Kilby '275 patent 
for the integrated circuit. TI applied in Japan for the patent in 1960, but it was not granted until 
1989-nearly three decades later! TI subsequently engaged nearly 30 firms in negotiations over 
licensing and royalty fees, which are estimated to now bring the company $250 million annually. 
The firm is still locked in a suit with Fujitsu Ltd. over whether to interpret the Kilby '275 patent 
narrowly or broadly. 
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Trademark registration is similarly slow. In the United States, the right to a trademark 
belongs to the firm that first used it commercially, but in Japan, foreign trademarks may be 
registered by Japanese firms to preempt their subsequent introduction by the originating firm.24 
As a consequence of recent reforms Japan has been moved from the list of' 'Special 301*' 
intellectual property rights "priority watch countries" where it had been since 1989, to the 
lower-priority "watch country" list in April 1993. In light of past difficulties in obtaining 
intellectual property rights in a timely fashion and securing their enforcement in Japan, it 
remains to be seen whether these new legal rights will represent a major step forward. A key 
may be the changing interests of major Japanese firms: as these firms become relatively more 
important innovators, their own political interests will increasingly lie with strengthening 
intellectual property rights protection.25 
ASSESSMENT OF MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS 
Estimation of the impact of the mostly overt barriers to trade in primary products is 
relatively straightforward. Bergsten and Noland (1993) report results that indicate that complete 
elimination of all agricultural trade barriers in Japan might increase the incomes of US producers 
by the equivalent of 28 percent of exports. (This would occur both through a combination of 
24
 Balassa and Noland (1988) give several examples of this practice. A more recent (1991) 
example comes from Texas, where, upon liberalization of the Japanese ice cream market, a 
Japanese firm tried to preemptively register the trademark of the locally beloved Blue Bell 
Dairy. The attempt was foiled by the high-level political intervention of then-Sen. Lloyd Bentsen 
(D-TX). 
25
 It would be desirable for the United States and Japan to move closer to the European 
Community standard in this area. This would involve bringing the United States into conformity 
with the first-to-file patent system used elsewhere in the world. For Japan it would mean 
speeding up the patent approval process (as it pledged in the SII negotiations) and discontinuing 
the practice of allowing pregrant patent challenges. 
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higher export volumes to Japan and through higher prices on exports to all markets.) 
Liberalization of Japanese fuels markets could lead to US export increases in fuels of 61 percent 
Bergsten and Cline, 1987), though environmental concerns about the exploitation of Alaskan oil 
could limit the potential impact. Comparable figures for potential gains in nonfuel minerals and 
services are unavailable. 
What attracts the most attention, however, are the potential gains in manufactures, and 
here the story is far more controversial. The reason is that the essentially hidden and arbitrary 
nature of these trade barriers poses very difficult problems for economists trying to assess their 
impact. As a consequence, a veritable cottage industry of researchers has eschewed the strategy 
of attempting to measure the impact of these informal barriers directly, and instead has focused 
on inferring their impact indirectly. The usual procedure followed in this literature is to estimate 
econometrically a model of international trade, and then to ascribe to trade policy the differences 
between actual and predicted trade flows. Since this amounts to an analysis of the error terms 
of the regression, the robustness of the underlying estimates is of crucial significance. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, these studies have reached a variety of conclusions as to the importance of 
Japanese trade policy. 
Saxonhouse (1983, 1989, 1992, 1993) has argued that the informal barriers, however 
vexing, are ultimately of little quantitative significance. To substantiate this position, he 
regresses either net or gross trade flows against cross-national data on factor endowments, 
excluding Japan from the sample. He finds that, in the vast majority of cases, accounting for 
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nearly all of Japan's trade, Japan's actual trade flows fall within statistical forecast bounds.26 
On this basis he concludes that, however unusual Japan's trade pattern, it can be explained on 
the basis of Japan's equally unusual factor endowments, without reference to trade policy, much 
less trade policy of a sub rosa sort. 
These widely cited studies have been criticized on a number of grounds. First, their 
conclusions are at variance with what we know to be true about formal Japanese trade policies. 
Tests on data for 1964, for example, fail to indicate that Japan's trade pattern was distinctive 
(Saxonhouse 1983), yet it is a matter of historical record that Japanese border measures were 
unusually high prior to the Kennedy Round. In the same paper, Saxonhouse reports results for 
1979 that indicate that Japan's trade pattern was not unusual in the rice sector—even though there 
was a complete import embargo. This inability to detect known instances of protection suggests 
that Saxonhouse's tests may have very low power against alternative explanations.27 
Balassa and Noland (1988) suggest one reason why this might be the case. The technique 
used to correct for possible errors in measurement of the factor endowments (or for variations 
in factor quality) is valid only if errors in the measurement (or variations in factor quality) and 
trade policies are unrelated. If trade protection is correlated with factor intensity (as basic 
26
 In a personal communication to the author, Saxonhouse has indicated that, according to 
the model used in the 1989 paper, if Japanese global imports in 1979 were as expected they 
would have been $7.2 billion (or 7.2 percent) higher than they were in fact. According to the 
model used in the 1993 paper, Japanese global imports would have been $8.8 billion (or 7.7 
percent) higher in 1983 than they were. 
27
 It should be recalled, however, that the tests measure whether the trade pattern is 
distinctive-so that if many other nations maintained barriers of a comparable importance the 
regressions would not identify Japan as an outlier, even though it was highly protected in 
absolute terms. 
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political economy would suggest), Saxonhouse's approach will attribute to measurement error 
precisely the effects of trade policy that one is trying to detect. So, for example, although Japan 
protects arable land, the Saxonhouse technique would attribute low agricultural imports to 
superior land quality and find no evidence of protection.28 Noland (1992a) imbedded the 
Saxonhouse model in a more general framework and confirmed the unreliability of the 
Saxonhouse approach, and using a model specification not used in Saxonhouse's papers, found 
some weak evidence that Japan is indeed an outlier. 
Noland then regressed the residuals of this first-stage regression against policy variables 
to investigate whether trade policies were correlated with these deviations from the expected 
trade pattern. His results indicate that Japan's unusual trade behavior is indeed related to both 
tariff and nontariff barriers in Japan, as well as to VERs applied to Japanese exports by Japan's 
trade partners. 
Lawrence (1991b) and Harrigan (1993a, 1993b) both examined bilateral trade in the 
context of models based on the assumption that countries' trade in differentiated products is 
proportional to their shares of world output. Lawrence concluded that Japan imports fewer 
manufactured goods than would be expected on the basis of the model. Using a slightly different 
approach, Harrigan found that using two different models that Japan in relative terms Japan 
imported 24-28 percent less than the US when differences in factor endowments were taken into 
account. He also concluded that, while Japan's manufactured imports were unusually low, so 
28
 In fact, results reported in Saxonhouse (1989) suggest that this method generates 
implausible estimates of differences in international factor quality (e.g., the productivity of 
capital in Great Britain is nearly 11 times the world average; Icelandic labor is more than four 
times as productive as the world average; education in Cyprus is more than five times the quality 
of the world average). 
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were its exports. Bilaterally both Japan and the US were more open vis-k-vis each other than 
was Europe to either. 
Saxonhouse (1992) analyzed bilateral net exports and obtained results somewhat similar 
to Harrigan's. He found that in 1985 Japan's net exports of manufactured goods to Europe were 
lower than expected, and Japan's net exports to the United States were $13.2 billion higher than 
expected. He attributes it to trade diversion due to European barriers against Japanese exports, 
but this could also be due to Japanese import barriers against US exports. Noland (1992b) found 
that Japanese imports are unusually low in sectors in which Japan faces VERs; this could be 
interpreted as supporting Saxonhouse's export diversion argument. In any event, this Saxonhouse 
paper is subject to the same methodological criticisms elaborated earlier. 
A number of studies have examined the possible impact of keiretsu on Japan's trade 
pattern. Kreinin (1988) surveyed the capital-goods procurement practices of the Australian 
subsidiaries of multinational firms. He found that the subsidiaries of Japanese firms used far less 
open procurement practices than did the subsidiaries of non-Japanese firms and were far more 
likely to purchase equipment from their home country. 
Three other studies examined this question econometrically in a single-country, cross-
industry framework. Petri (1991) found that import penetration was negatively related to the 
share of final purchases by business and government and the degree of oligopoly in distribution. 
If businesses and government were to achieve the same import propensity as households 
(controlling for differences in the composition of demand), Japanese manufactured imports would 
double. Lawrence (1991b) added variables relating to keiretsu affiliation to Petri's model and 
concluded that, while vertical keiretsu were efficiency-enhancing (reducing imports and 
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promoting exports), horizontal keiretsu were not (they reduced imports only). Elimination of the 
keiretsu would lead to an initial increase in manufactured imports of $30 billion (or more than 
100 percent from a 1985 base), which would then be partially offset by a depreciation of the 
yen. Fung (1991) found that the presence of keiretsu increased Japan's trade surplus with the rest 
of the world in general, and the United States in particular. 
The fundamental problem with these three studies is that one cannot say anything sensible 
about the implications of Japanese practices for world welfare by examining cross-industry trade 
performance from the perspective of a single country. One study, Noland (1992a), addresses this 
issue. First, a cross-national model of comparative advantage is estimated. The residuals from 
these regressions represent the component of actual trade flows that cannot be explained by 
factor endowments (i.e., unexplained deviations from comparative advantage). These residuals 
for Japan are then regressed cross-industry against trade policy and keiretsu variables. This 
approach provides a check on the other keiretsu studies and attempts to test the indirect 
inferences about trade policies made by the studies discussed above. These results broadly 
confirm the earlier results: keiretsu are consistently associated with higher than expected net 
exports and with lower than expected imports. Whether this is due to keiretsu enhancing their 
members' efficiency or acting as barriers to entry is not determinable.29 
29
 These studies have been criticized on a variety of grounds. First, there is no formal 
definition of keiretsu, so the classifications used in these studies are somewhat arbitrary. The 
particular classification scheme used in all of these studies puts a heavy weight on financial 
linkages (main banks loans and cross-shareholding) to determine keiretsu affiliation. One could 
construct measures using alternative criteria which could lead to different results. 
Second, they use fairly small samples (50 or fewer industries). It is also possible that the 
results are being driven by one or two industries with low imports and a high degree of keiretsu 
affiliation (e.g., automobiles). Nevertheless, the apparent consistency in these results, obtained 
independently by different researchers using differing models and data sets, suggest that keiretsu 
25 
The studies just reviewed attempt to estimate the impact of public policies and private 
preferences on trade quantities. Another approach is to examine price evidence. Numerous 
surveys have found that traded-goods prices are far higher in Japan than elsewhere (Economic 
Planning Agency of Japan 1989; US Department of Commerce 1989, 1991; Summers and 
Heston 1991; Union Bank of Switzerland 1991). Sazanami et al. (1993), using import and 
producer unit price data from the Japanese input-output table, have calculated the "tariff-
equivalents" of Japanese nontariff barriers. Their results are astounding, indicating tariff-
equivalents of more than 500 percent in some cases. 
Price differences have been also discovered in bilateral data collected in the context of 
the SII negotiations. The joint survey conducted by the US Department of Commerce and MITI 
in 1991 found that two-thirds of the products covered were on average 37 percent more 
expensive in Japan than in the United States; the survey done in 1989 obtained quantitatively 
similar results. Since unlike in the study by Sazanami et al. these data involve exact brand and 
model comparisons, the question immediately arises as to why arbitrage does not eliminate these 
price differences. The persistence of these differentials suggests that they are not simply due to 
short-run exchange rate misalignment, but rather that they are the product of some type of 
market closure.30 
A variety of hypotheses have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. One is that 
the high retail prices of traded goods in Japan are due to high costs in the retail sector. These 
have a significant impact on the Japanese trade pattern. 
30
 A distinct line of research has investigated the pricing strategies of Japanese firms in 
response to exchange rate changes (e.g., Loopesko and Johnson 1987, Marston 1991). 
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include the notoriously high price of land, as well as alleged inefficiencies in the distribution 
system (Lawrence 1991b, Ito and Maruyama 1991, Itoh 1991). Another set of explanations 
emphasizes conventional resistance factors to international trade such as transportation costs and 
trade barriers. Bergsten and Cline (1987) estimate that the aggregate tariff-equivalent of nontariff 
barriers of all sorts imposed on US exports to the Japanese market is on the order of 25 percent. 
Lastly, some researchers have argued that the high prices in Japan are due to strategic decisions 
by oligopolistic firms: either rent extraction by foreign exporters or Japanese importers 
generating high prices in Japan (Cline 1990), or exclusionary practices and dumping by members 
of the keiretsu, contributing to high prices at home and low prices abroad (Cheng and Kreinin 
1991). Keiretsu domination of distribution channels is also alleged to contribute to the price 
differentials. 
Noland (1992b) used the Department of Commerce-MITI survey data to test these 
hypotheses. The results of this paper indicate that these price differentials are associated with 
trade policies (in particular the presence of nontariff barriers) and the existence of keiretsu, 
suggesting, in confirmation of the trade quantity studies, that these are the main sources of 
market closure. (Indeed, these results would appear to tilt the explanation of the effect of the 
keiretsu on trade volumes toward the market closure hypothesis and away from the enhanced-
competitiveness hypothesis.) A conservative estimate is that elimination of these sources of 
market closure might lead to a more than 20 percent increase in the volume of manufactured 
imports into Japan. (In comparison, elimination of all formal tariff and nontariff barriers might 
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lead to a 3 percent increase in manufactured import volumes.)31 
The results of this study along with six others are summarized in table 3. It is 
unsurprising that the results appear to be as divergent as these are: the question that they are 
trying to answer is an inherently difficult one. The studies can be broken down into three 
groups. The first group consists of Petri (1991) and Lawrence (1991b), who generate estimates 
of the potential increase in Japanese manufactured imports of 54.3 to 100.0 percent. For 
purposes of analyzing bilateral trade, these studies have two drawbacks. First, they were derived 
on the basis of single-country, cross-industry regressions, and so do not take into account the 
characteristics of countries other than Japan. Second, they refer to global, not bilateral, trade. 
The Saxonhouse papers make up the next group. These figures are not directly 
comparable to the others: they refer to all imports, not just manufactured imports as do the other 
papers. Nonetheless, these results give the impression of implying somewhat less unusual 
importing behavior on the part of Japan-indeed that Japan's trade is as its factor endowments 
predict. This does not mean that Japan is a free trader, but only that its trade is not any more 
distorted than the world average. Saxonhouse (1992) interprets his finding that 1985 Japanese 
net exports were $13.2 billion higher than predicted as reflecting diversion of exports from 
Europe to the United States due to European trade restrictions. (This paper is not included in 
31
 Applying the coefficients reported in this paper to the sample means (with the recognition 
that the sample may not be representative of the whole manufacturing-goods sector) yields the 
finding that elimination of the trade impediments would lead to a 32.5 percent fall in import 
prices. Noland (1989) reports a long-run price elasticity of demand for Japanese imports of -
0.67. Presumably this is a lower-bound estimate for manufactured goods. Applying this elasticity 
to the price decline above, one obtains a 21.8 percent increase in import volume. 
Alternatively, Bergsten and Cline's estimate of —1.16 for the Japanese import price 
elasticity of demand, applied to the price change noted above, yields an estimate of potential 
manufactured import growth of 37.7 percent. 
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table 3 because it refers to net exports and is even less directly comparable to the other studies.) 
Putting the three papers together, one gets the impression that both Japanese imports and exports 
may be lower than expected. In any event, the previously detailed problems with the modeling 
approach used in these papers point to the unreliability of their results. 
The final group of studies, by Bergsten and Cline (1987), Lawrence (1987), and Noland 
(1992b), generates estimates of potential increases in Japanese imports in a lower, narrower 
range than the Lawrence and Petri papers: 21.8 to 45.4 percent.32 Three things should be noted 
about these studies. First, they are based on three different methodologies: industry-by-industry 
estimates in the case of Bergsten and Cline, cross-national regressions in the Lawrence study, 
and bilateral price regressions in the Noland study. Second, Bergsten and Cline, and Noland are 
based on US-Japan bilateral data. Third, some liberalization clearly occurred in Japan between 
1980 and 1991; one should expect the potential manufactured import increases to decline. Using 
the estimates in the Bergsten and Cline, and Noland cases, this indeed occurs: the highest 
estimate, Lawrence's 41.3 percent, is based on data from 1980; the next highest, 34.9 percent 
(the midpoint of the Bergsten-Cline range), which is approximately 15 percent lower, is derived 
from 1985 data; and the lowest, 29.8 percent (the midpoint of Noland's range), calculated from 
1991 data, is 15 percent lower still. All of this suggests that, from the standpoint of estimating 
current potential manufactured import increases in Japan, the greatest probability weight should 
be placed on the Noland (1992b) estimates. 
These estimates are by their very nature imprecise: complete liberalization in Japan would 
32
 It should be noted that according to Goto (1990) that when the Lawrence model was 
reestimated with the variables expressed in levels rather than logs, that Japan was no longer 
unique. 
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engender changes in economic behavior beyond the historical experience on which these models 
are based. They are interesting, nonetheless. According to the estimates reported in Bergsten 
and Noland (1993), if Japan were to eliminate all formal and informal barriers to trade, US 
exports to Japan would initially increase by somewhere in the range of $8.9 billion to $18.2 
billion, with a central estimate of $13.6 billion.33 
Greater access is in the US economic interest. It would also contribute to reducing 
political tensions both by eliminating sources of sectoral trade disputes as well as by contributing 
to a reduction in the overall bilateral deficit. The questions are, What should the United States' 
strategic priorities be in pursuing greater access? And what tactics should the United States use 
to achieve them? 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
Certain recurrent themes emerge in the industry case studies explored by Bergsten and 
Noland (1993). First, the Japanese government has pursued more obvious policies of industrial 
development than the United States. This is not to say that the United States has no industrial 
policies—it clearly does—but rather that Japanese policies have had a much more narrow 
industrial goal, without the national security emphasis that has played a major role in US policy 
33
 Increasing market access in Japan would have an impact on the bilateral deficit, although 
by how much is difficult to say. The initial increase in Japanese imports would be accompanied 
by increased Japanese efficiency and by a depreciation of the yen. Both would tend to both 
dampen the import increase, as well as encourage more Japanese exports. In the end, the 
bilateral deficit would shrink by something less than the full $8.9 billion to $18.2 billion. In 
reality, liberalization would occur over an extended period of time, so that the reduction in the 
deficit due to liberalization would be intertwined with fluctuations in the balance due to 
macroeconomic developments. As a consequence, it could be very difficult to disentangle the 
effects of liberalization even in retrospect. None of these qualifications should detract from the 
desirability of gaining greater access to the Japanese market, however. 
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formation. Consequently, in all of the cases studied, Japanese government action has played a 
significant role in how competition between US and Japanese firms has been conducted. 
How this competition has played out has depended in large part on the fundamental 
competitive strengths of industries in the two countries. As a consequence, there are basically 
two typologies of conflict: the first arises where demands for trade action arise from import-
competing sectors in the United States faced with a competitive Japanese industry (notably 
automobiles, and arguably semiconductors); the second where competitive US firms seek access 
to a restricted Japanese market (computers, telecommunications, securities, retailing, 
construction, and arguably semiconductors). While the dynamics of the first type are relatively 
well-known, the second type of trade conflict, arising from the access problems encountered by 
US firms in the Japanese market, presents US policymakers, with more difficult and subtle 
problems and choices. The importance of these export access disputes has risen as new measures 
introduced into US trade law such as Section 301, Special 301, and the late lamented Super 301, 
have given US exporters recourse to non-GATT remedies. The recurrent pattern that emerges 
from the Bergsten and Noland (1993) case studies is of competitive US firms denied access to 
the Japanese market by a combination of public policies and private behavior. In a number of 
cases, this takes the form of officially or informally sanctioned cartel behavior by Japanese 
oligopolists. The response of some firms is to seek US government assistance in prying open the 
market. (Presumably some firms, frustrated by their experiences, simply give up and are never 
heard from again.) If the US government takes up their case typically using the new trade laws 
as leverage, and sufficient pressure is applied to Japan (including overt threats of retaliation in 
a number of cases), possibilities for change begin to appear. 
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The goals of the Japanese government (assuage foreign pressure) and Japanese business 
(maintain oligopoly profits) are obvious, as is the solution: buy off the foreign pressure. In 
practice this means allowing a particular foreign firm or firms into the domestic oligopoly and 
a share of cartel rents in exchange for a cessation of political pressure. 
This solution, although perhaps satisfactory to the Japanese government, Japanese 
business, and the privileged foreign firm(s), creates a dilemma for US policymakers and those 
in third countries. Put starkly, should the United States be satisfied with certain of its firms 
gaining possibly privileged access to the Japanese market, or should it press for more 
fundamental liberalization to facilitate the entry of additional US and foreign firms on a 
competitive basis? 
Although it is the structure of the Japanese economy that sets up this dilemma, it is the 
dynamics of US policymaking that makes the dilemma particularly vexing. The United States 
has a producer-oriented, complainant-initiated trade policy system. In colloquial terms, it's the 
squeaky wheel that gets the grease. Thus, US trade policymakers face two related problems: how 
to prioritize the myriad problems that they confront with Japan, and how to respond to co-
optation opportunities presented by Japanese policies. 
Priorities should be set on the basis of the likely payoff to the US economy and the 
likelihood of success. The obvious solution would be to calculate the present discounted value 
of prospective trade deals and prioritize them according to this ranking. One would want to take 
into account the stream of benefits to the US economy as well as the political costs and 
likelihood of successfully concluding a deal. The fact that one would regard the benefits as a 
stream extending into future years would tend to tilt the calculation toward rapidly growing 
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markets. Focusing on the impact on the US economy (as distinct from the sales of US firms) 
would tend to tilt the prioritization toward activities with a large domestic component. While 
advocating the application of basic cost-benefit reasoning would seem singularly unoriginal, 
given the incentives facing US policymakers this is not necessarily so.34 
To make these implications concrete, Table 4 reports potential export increases calculated 
by Bergsten and Noland (1993). (It should be emphasized that these cases are listed for purely 
illustrative purposes and are not comprehensive.)35 By far the largest impact from liberalization 
has been in cigarettes, where US exports increased by $1.2 billion, followed by beef ($500 
million), the STA ($415 million as an upper bound), and citrus ($100 million).36 The smallest 
apparent gains were in fiber optics ($33 million). On the basis of these admittedly crude 
34
 Recent trade deals, including the Semiconductor Trade Agreement and targets on auto 
parts purchases, have been specified in terms of corporate identities, not location of production. 
(To wit, a TI semiconductor produced in Kyushu counts as American, while a Hitachi chip 
produced in California counts as Japanese.) The proposed quotas on Japanese-maker 
automobiles, which would count the output of Japanese plants in the United States as Japanese, 
would extend this trend. 
This is fundamentally the wrong way to go. The US government should promote the 
interests of its citizens, which coincide most extensively with the interests of the internationally 
immobile factors of production. Consequently, issues should be prioritized according to their 
impact on the US economy, not the worldwide sales of US firms. 
This has two immediate implications. First, trade pacts should be negotiated on the basis 
of benefits to the US economy rather than corporate identity. Second, deals that result in exports 
of goods and services from the United States would therefore tend to receive higher priority than 
deals that would result in higher sales for US firms, but where the production of goods and 
services would occur abroad. 
35
 It should also be noted that while the calculations refer to bilateral export increases, the 
global increase is really more relevant. As emphasized in Bergsten and Noland (1993) bilateral 
balances are of no economic interest per se. 
36
 In addition to exports, the STA may have increased the sales of North American firms in 
the Japanese market, generating additional benefits to the US economy in the form of remitted 
profits and increased headquarters activities in the United States. An upper-bound estimate of 
the sales impact of the STA would be an increase of $1.1 billion. A similar issue arises with 
regard to potential gains in computers, where a significant share of the increased sales would 
be sourced outside the United States. 
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calculations, it would take three fiber optics cases to have the impact on the US economy that 
the citrus deal did, 15 fiber optics cases to equal beef, or 36 fiber optics cases to match 
cigarettes. 
The second column in table 4 reports some potential gains in sectors yet to be liberalized. 
To reiterate, these are by their very nature speculative estimates and subject to large errors. 
They are interesting nonetheless. The largest potential gain, more than $1 billion, comes from 
eliminating discriminatory public procurement practices in (nonsuper-) computers. (Again, this 
ignores the estimated $1 billion in estimated sales sourced outside the United States.) This is 
followed by liberalization in fuels ($789 million) and in wood products ($750 million), the entry 
of Toys 'R' Us into the Japanese retailing market ($150 million), and the elimination of 
discriminatory public procurement practices in supercomputers ($30 million). The listing of Toys 
'R' Us is a bit misleading, since it was part of a broader effort to get retailers into the Japanese 
market, and the gains to other retailers have not been quantified. Nonetheless, the differences 
in magnitudes are striking: it would take 25 supercomputer deals to equal the potential gains in 
wood products, or 36 supercomputer public procurement agreements to equal one mainframe 
computer public procurement accord. 
These comparisons should be qualified in three ways. First, they ignore any possible 
spillovers or externalities in the high-technology cases. Nonetheless, these figures suggest that 
there would have to be some extremely large externalities to a product such as fiber optics or 
supercomputers to compensate for the fundamental differences in export potential. The second 
qualification reinforces this caveat: these figures are the direct (not total) effects. If indirect 
effects on the rest of the economy through interindustry linkages are taken into account, the 
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natural resource\based products will look even better, since they presumably have a lower import 
content. 
Third, these estimates are static. As argued above, one would want to attach a greater 
priority to growing markets, both because the future payoffs are expected to be larger, and 
because new entrants in a growing market would presumably encounter less political resistance 
in Japan. These considerations might tilt the calculations toward high technology, where 
relatively small initial payoffs in manufacturing might also be parlayed into larger gains if they 
helped firms penetrate the "design-in" process. 
More generally, these criteria will tend to favor cases involving products exported from 
the United States over those where a significant share of the products and/or services are sourced 
outside the United States (such as semiconductors and Toys 'R' Us). 
Having established some priority guidelines, the next issue is of tactics. US policymakers 
have essentially three options, in increasing order of difficulty in attainment: accept the entry 
of US firms into the Japanese oligopoly; go for a VIE, under which multiple firms (including 
foreign firms) can compete for market share; or aim for complete liberalization. 
In sectors where there is one dominant producer (e.g., fiber optics, supercomputers), 
options 1 and 2 are in effect similar, and US policymakers may face overwhelming political 
incentives to adopt these approaches. Given the commitments of bureaucratic and political 
resources that attempting to achieve complete liberalization would require, satisficing with option 
1 or 2 may not be a bad strategy. 
As the number of US producers (or potential producers) increases, however, accepting 
co-optation or a VIE appears increasingly less attractive. Accepting co-optation, by pressuring 
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the Japanese government until particular US firms have gained market access and then backing 
off, would imply a preferential disposal of rents that would be difficult to sustain politically. A 
VIE solution that facilitated more equitable access among competing US firms would be more 
acceptable politically. The question then becomes: When are VIEs preferable to traditional 
procedural liberalization efforts?37 
A certain degree of skepticism is in order. First, VIEs are likely to be captured 
politically. Producer groups in the exporting country will want the covered industries defined 
as narrowly as possible, to eliminate intergroup competition and to assure themselves that they 
will reap the prospective benefits. The importing country will also want to define them as 
narrowly as possible, to facilitate implementation. (Remember that the importing-country 
government ultimately has to ensure that the targets are attained.) Thus, there is a natural 
coincidence of interests between domestic producer groups and foreign governments to set up 
a patchwork of narrow VIEs. Indeed, the Japanese would make incumbents the recipients of 
VIEs, essentially "taking hostages" among US firms and turning them into allies against all new 
entrants, domestic or foreign. 
Indeed, the ability of the importing-country government to implement and enforce such 
an agreement will be positively related to the degree of government involvement in the industry 
and inversely related to the number of firms. This suggests that the simplest case in which to 
implement a VIE would be that of a monopsonistic public corporation such as a national 
telecommunications monopoly. (In this case the obvious first-best solution is to negotiate the 
removal of public procurement preferences.) Implementation will grow increasingly difficult as 
37
 For welfare analyses of VIEs see Dinopoulous and Kreinin (1990). 
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the number of importing firms increases. Attempts to coordinate importing behavior across firms 
will inevitably contribute to the cartelization of the industry. Moreover, if the Japanese firms 
export to and produce in the United States, the US government runs the risk of encouraging 
cartelization and then importing the cartel behavior into its own market. 
This raises the issue of third parties. A VIE must either include or exclude third parties. 
If it excludes them, it may shift rents to the demandeur country at the expense of third parties, 
and encourage emulation by other exporting countries elsewhere.38 (Indeed, the VIE may set 
a precedent, and the original demandeur may find itself the object of VIE demands from others.) 
If instead the VIE includes third parties, it reduces one of the avenues by which cartel behavior 
in the demandeur's own market can be disciplined. 
Second, the quantitative targets are fundamentally arbitrary. One can look at market 
shares in third-country markets, but these are little more than crude and debatable benchmarks. 
There is no consensus standard or methodology forjudging what market shares ought to be, and 
one lesson of the sophisticated econometric literature surveyed above is that a significant amount 
of art as well as science is involved in these judgments. One observer's invisible barrier is 
another's superior competitiveness, and experience shows that market outcomes can vary greatly 
from the a priori estimates of knowledgeable observers; indeed, the negotiated outcomes could 
be far less desirable than those obtained by removing the trade barrier.39 
38
 In the auto parts case, European and Australian officials have complained that purchases 
have been diverted from their exporters to US firms. Japanese officials have denied that any 
diversion away from third-party suppliers has occurred. 
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 A case in point is US cigarette exports to Japan, which faced multitudinous tariff and 
nontariff barriers prior to liberalization: annual US exports were $95 million, accounting for less 
than 1 percent of the Japanese market. Three contemporaneous studies addressed the potential 
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Moreover, there is no obvious time dimension to the VIE (should they last for a fixed 
period? indefinitely?), nor is there any obvious way to determine how the quantitative target 
should evolve over time. 
This leads to the third problem, namely, that in most of the cases surveyed,credible 
threats of retaliation have been important in achieving action in Japan. The VIE puts the 
exporting country in the position of making a decision whether to retaliate on the basis of factors 
outside either government's control, such as changes in the composition of demand or 
technological innovations (as in the case of the STA) or exchange rate changes. This would 
inevitably erode the credibility of enforcement of these agreements. 
Lastly, it is always tempting for a large country to use its inherent market power to 
achieve its desired ends. It is almost assuredly true, however, that the adoption of a VIE strategy 
by the United States will create a precedent that will be adopted by other countries and will 
come back to haunt its originator. 
These concerns reinforce the presumption in favor of first-best solutions. In cases where 
there are clear instances of public impediments to imports (such as the discriminatory public 
increases in foreign market shares: Saxonhouse (1983) described such potential gains as 
"modest"; Bergsten and Cline (1985) estimated that, with liberalization, US exports might 
increase by $98 million; and the US Department of Commerce (in a study cited by Bergsten and 
Cline) estimated that the market might grow by $1.9 billion. In point of fact, US exports 
increased 13-fold, from less than $95 million in 1985 to more than $1.3 billion in 1990, after 
the market was opened. Similar is the case of beef: contemporary observers (e.g., the 
Department of Commerce, and Bergsten and Cline) predicted that US exports would increase 
by $280 million with liberalization. In fact, the increase in exports has been nearly twice this 
amount. Likewise, Bergsten and Cline, and the US Department of Commerce, predicted that 
citrus exports might increase by $40 million with liberalization; exports in fact grew by more 
than $100 million. In hindsight, it is very difficult to believe that trade officials could have 
obtained negotiated solutions in any of these cases that would have been nearly as advantageous 
to US interests as the market solution obtained through genuine liberalization. 
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procurement cases), it would be better to negotiate the removal of the barrier. Similarly, in the 
cases of private entry barriers, it would be preferable to apply internationally agreed-upon 
competition policies, recognizing that in cases where there are only a few potential exporters, 
the cost-benefit calculation may indicate that the co-optation option may make sense. In the case 
of high-technology development programs it would be best to negotiate agreements on 
countervailing subsidies. 
Nonetheless, VIEs do appear to be suited to a particular kind of problem that the United 
States sometimes faces in its dealings with Japan. Foreign providers of industrial intermediates 
or capital goods wanting to sell into the Japanese market (or even to the Japanese firms' 
subsidiaries outside of Japan) sometimes find that their entry is blocked by the contracting 
relationships of the vertical keiretsu system. This system may be efficiency-enhancing and may 
warrant emulation by non-Japanese firms, as some have already begun to do. At the same time, 
these long-standing relationships were developed in the context of what was essentially a closed 
system. Once these firms become major players in the international economic system,there is 
a clear political (and arguably an economic) rationale for developing a broader, more inclusive, 
international web of relationships. 
Moreover, there may be cases, such as semiconductors and supercomputers, where the 
issues are such that internationally agreed-upon rules of competition are unlikely to be 
formulated in the politically relevant time frame. In these cases policymakers will be inevitably 
pushed toward the second best solutions. Once one has entered the world of second-best, 
evaluating the desirability of piecemeal policies becomes extremely difficult. Nevertheless, these 
are the choices that policymakers face in reality. 
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In these cases, VIEs may make some sense as a mechanism to force the adaptation of a 
system that was developed in the closed, policy-distorted environment of Japan in the 1950s and 
1960s. A VIE could then be considered as a temporary compensatory policy to move the 
Japanese system closer to a free trade equilibrium. It may act as a prod to internationalize the 
keiretsu. It is precisely this encouragement to bring non-Japanese firms aboard in product 
development and the * 'design-in'' phase that could be the avenue by which this inherently 
discriminatory structure is made compatible with an open international trade system. Once the 
process of inclusion begins, presumably some non-Japanese firms will succeed and some fail in 
developing stable and productive relationships with their Japanese counterparts; this is as it 
should be. At the same time, Japanese firms will have a positive incentive to find capable, 
efficient partners. 
Yet in light of the potential pitfalls of the VIE approach, one should be very cautious in 
advocating them. It makes no sense to propose them for consumer products or final goods of any 
sort. They should only be considered in the case of industrial intermediates. They would make 
the most sense in rapidly expanding markets where new entrants could be accommodated without 
displacing existing domestic production. Even then, their application should be weighed carefully 
against first-best alternatives. 
CURRENT POLICY 
Current US policy centers on the Framework negotiations between the United States and 
Japan which were begun in June 1993, which can regarded as the successor to the earlier Market 
Oriented Sector Selective (MOSS) and Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks. The 
Framework document agreed to at the time of the Tokyo summit in July 1993 calls for the two 
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countries to undertake macroeconomic, sectoral and structural reforms, and cooperation in global 
issues of common interest such as the global environment.40 The sectoral and structural parts 
of the talks are organized into five baskets: government procurement, regulatory reform and 
competitveness, other major sectors, economic harmonization, and implementation of existing 
arrangements and measures.41 
The Framework talks represent a departure from previous negotiations in two substantive 
ways. First, and most controversially, is the use of "objective criteria" which some 
commentators (e.g. Nezu (1993)) have likened to targets or VIEs. In matter of fact, the 
Framework agreement states that "assessment will be based on sets of objective criteria, either 
qualitative or quantitative or both as appropriate, which will be established using relevant 
information and/or data that both Governments will evaluate." In other words, the two 
governments are to establish agreed upon indicators of progress. The argument in favor of the 
benchmark approach is that by establishing objective criteria progress can be independently 
verified allowing negotiators to agree on areas where problems have successfully been resolved 
40
 Contrary to the mistaken impression of some commentators, the Framework does not 
include quantitative targets for the external balances of either Japan or the United States, 
although Japan does commit itself to "a highly significant decrease in its current account 
surplus". 
41
 Topics under the government procurement basket include sector-specific issues such as 
Japanese procurement practices in computers, supercomputers, satellites, medical technology, 
and telecommunications, as well as overall central government and sub-national government 
policies in both countries. The regulatory reform basket includes issues of policies and practices 
relating to financial services, insurance, competition policy, distribution, and US export 
competitiveness. The other major sectors basket involves autos and parts. The economic 
harmonization basket includes foreign direct investment, intellectual property rights, access to 
technology, and long-term buyer-supplier relationships. The implementation basket is concerned 
with implementation of existing agreements between the two countries (including SII). 
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and to focus on areas where progress has been lacking. The main criticism of the approach 
(other than it detracts from the multilateral system) is that it could degenerate into a system of 
discriminatory VIEs. In fact, there is no evidence that this has occurred. Indeed, the agreement 
explicitly states that the US and Japan are committed to the multilateral system, and that 
"benefits under this Framework will be on a Most Favored Nation basis." 
The other innovation of the Framework talks is that explicitly incorporates biannual 
meetings of the Heads of Government. The importance of this is that it dramatically raises the 
political profile of the process and will in all likelihood significantly increase the pressure on 
policymakers to make steady progress on resolving outstanding issues. 
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